Dr. Gil Baram is a senior lecturer (US Associate Professor) at the Political Studies Department, Bar Ilan University. She is a non-resident research scholar at the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC) University of California, Berkeley. She is also a senior adjunct research fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Previously, she was a Fulbright Cybersecurity postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University.

Dr. Baram’s research explores, among other areas, AI-driven cyber threats, the impact of technology on national security, the role of Intelligence agencies in cyber operations, cyber threats to space systems, cyber diplomacy and norms development, and data-based approaches to cyber conflict research.

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As geopolitical rivalries increasingly manifest in cyberspace, the ability to create order amid digital disorder has become a significant challenge for the international community. This paper examines the strategic potential of joint cyber attribution—defined as the coordinated identification and public condemnation of state-sponsored cyberattacks by multiple states—as an emerging mechanism for collective accountability in a fragmented cyber landscape.

While unilateral attribution has served as a tool for states to assert norms and deter adversaries, it often suffers from perceptions of bias, limited legitimacy, and geopolitical contestation. In contrast, joint attribution introduces a multilateral approach to these efforts, presenting them as acts of consensus-building and norm enforcement rather than merely unilateral signaling.

This study analyzes key incidents, such as the 2022 coordinated response by the US, the UK, and NATO allies to the Iranian cyberattack on Albania. It draws on newly compiled data from the European Repository of Cyber Incidents (EuRepoC) to explore how joint attribution can enhance the credibility, impact, and geopolitical significance of attribution statements.

The paper argues that joint attribution directly addresses fundamental challenges in cyberspace: the opacity of technical evidence, the politicization of cyber conflicts, and the strategic risks associated with unilateral actions. By pooling intelligence and presenting a united front, states can more effectively establish boundaries for acceptable behavior and mobilize international support for adherence to norms. This multilateral approach catalyzes the diffusion of norms, reinforcing behavioral expectations beyond formal treaty processes.

However, the practice of joint attribution is still in its early stages and remains inconsistent. Differing perceptions of threats, constraints on intelligence sharing, and misaligned political interests limit both the frequency and inclusiveness of joint attributions. Additionally, the predominance of Western-aligned coalitions risks deepening geopolitical divides.

Joint attribution should be viewed as part of a broader restructuring of cyberspace governance—a practical and evolving strategy to establish order amid increasing disorder. Thus, it serves as a valuable complement to UN-led initiatives and multi-stakeholder efforts, having the potential to accelerate the consolidation of norms through operational practice.