Anna Oriishi is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Information and Communications Policy (IICP) in Japan. Her research examines policymaking and implementation in information and communication technology, with a focus on the security and governance of communications networks and emerging technologies. Her broader policy interests include national conflicts, administrative structures, and bureaucratic politics, with a core interest in communication as both a practice and a policy domain. Anna earned her BA in Environment and Information Studies and MA in Media and Governance from Keio University. During her master’s program., she passed the national civil servant examination and began her career as a government bureaucrat while continuing her academic studies. She holds a Ph.D. in Media and Governance from Keio University. She was named a 2023 Pacific Telecommunications Council Emerging Scholar, and her research has been published in the Journal of Cybersecurity and other academic outlets.

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The global governance of submarine communication cables, once regarded as a matter of technical coordination and market efficiency, has transformed profoundly. The expansion of internet infrastructure in the post–Cold War era was driven mainly by private corporations while direct state involvement declined. However, the intensification of geopolitical tensions, particularly those involving the United States and China, has re-established the state as a central actor in submarine cable governance. This shift indicates a broader re-ordering of cyberspace governance, in which physical infrastructure is intricately intertwined with national security, industrial policy, and strategic alliances. This study analyzes the transformation of submarine cable governance through the lens of U.S. foreign policy from 2000 to 2024. Focusing on five policy dimensions—(1) information diplomacy, (2) strategic dialogues, (3) international negotiations, (4) development assistance, and (5) regulatory authorization—it examines the diplomatic tools employed by the United States to exclude Chinese firms, redirect cable landing points, and secure trusted networks. The findings show that U.S. diplomacy expanded from bilateral to multilateral approaches, while simultaneously strengthening policies that advanced engagement in domestic licensing regimes. As a result, the United States has emerged as a leader in constructing a public–private governance coalition with like-minded states, in opposition to China’s state-capitalist model. Through a whole-of-government and whole-of-nations approach to alliance-building, Washington has actively extended its influence even over cables that do not land on its territory. The analysis highlights the shift in U.S. policy from bilateral interventions in the early 2000s to a multilateral, alliance-driven approach under the Biden administration, leveraging frameworks such as the Quad, the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, and joint UN statements. Unlike in the past, when governance was characterized by state monopolies or cable-cutting strategies, modern governance integrates regulatory oversight with multilateral coordination and public–private partnerships. The findings suggest that submarine cable diplomacy constitutes a new form of infrastructural geopolitics, in which liberal states seek to re-order cyberspace by constructing normative and material alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. By positioning submarine cables as both “conduits of global data” and “instruments of geopolitical influence,” this study contributes to understanding cyberspace as reconstructed not only through code and content but also through competing architectures of connectivity. Accordingly, the struggle over cables symbolizes the re-ordering of global digital governance, where infrastructure becomes both the battlefield and the tool of geopolitical contestation.