Why do some states treat technological dependence as a political and security problem while others tolerate or even embrace it? While technology operates as a power base and helps constitute structure, the early stage of technological development tends to produce asymmetry between states: a primacy state that innovates, uses, and exports the technology and dependent states that adopt and rely on foreign supply. This project advances systemic theory by integrating the risks and utilities of technological power to explain a dependent state’s decision. It begins with two core attributes of the primacy state from a dependent state’s perspective: the reliability of existing dependence and the alignment between current application and the strategic use of technology. To probe the theoretical mechanism, this article examines the case of the Global Navigation Satellite System, focusing on the dependence of the European Union and Japan on the US GPS in particular. The EU pursues developing an autonomous global navigation system called Galileo because it is concerned about US control of unreliable systems and the expected strategic utility of such a system is misaligned with merely getting precise place, velocity, and position data. On the other hand, Japan’s understanding of a reliable relationship with the US, along with its alignment between data collection and a focus on value-added downstream markets, led to continued dependence. It contributes to scholars by highlighting a dependent state’s calculation of risk and utility derived from technological dependence.

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