Jelena Vićić is an Assistant Professor of International Studies in the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington. Her research interests lie at the intersection of emerging technology and international conflict, with a particular focus on influence operations, national security, and strategic state competition. She employs experimental wargaming, statistical modeling, and semantic network analysis to uncover how actors use cyberspace to pursue strategic objectives, manage escalation, and influence public opinion. Her academic work has been published in Journal of Peace Research, Intelligence and National Security, and International Interactions, while her writing also appears in Scientific American, War on the Rocks, and Lawfare.

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Much of what is known about state activity in cyberspace is often the result of operations becoming exposed, spreading beyond intended targets, or otherwise escaping operational control. Yet states such as Russia, China, and North Korea appear to have elevated perceptions of their cyber power by proactively using cyber capabilities. If cyber power is evaluated in terms of operational effectiveness e.g. the ability to infiltrate networks, remain stealthy, disrupt or surveil systems, and impose costs on adversaries while avoiding attribution, why do failed cyber operations sometimes enhance perceptions of cyber power, rather than tamper them?Because cyber capabilities are difficult to directly observe, cyber operations gone public, even unsuccessful or uncontrolled ones, can function as signals of cunning, resolve, risk tolerance, and willingness to violate norms. In an increasingly multipolar system, revisionist states seeking to challenge the status quo may therefore drive reputational benefits from using cyber capabilities regardless of operational precision.This paper presents an original survey experiment examining how different cyber outcomes shape public perceptions of a state’s cyber capability, threat level, international influence, and geopolitical standing. In so doing, it contributes to debates on cyber power by showing how perceptions of such power may be socially constructed. More broadly, the paper examines how cyber conflict may enable emerging or revisionist powers to accumulate international influence in an era of emergent “digital state of nature.”

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