Prevailing accounts of Taiwan’s “silicon shield” suggest that global dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors enhances deterrence and secures US support amid conflict with China. This paper challenges that assumption through Taiwan’s strategic discourse, where skepticism persists about deterrence, external commitments, and cyber vulnerabilities in an emerging digital state of nature. Drawing on policy debates, expert commentary, and industrial strategy, it argues semiconductor dominance yields ambiguous security effects. Asymmetric interdependence boosts Taiwan’s value in US-led tech-security networks yet fuels cyber espionage, evident in 2025 China-linked campaigns targeting TSMC suppliers via phishing and malware, and accelerates supply chain diversification, eroding leverage. The shield fails to reliably deter China: strategic stakes may trump economic disruption costs, amplified by hybrid cyber threats like daily DDoS on Taiwan’s infrastructure. US dependence bolsters intervention rationale but not credibility concerns. Viewing Taiwan as an active agent in great-power rivalry, the paper advances debates on interdependence, alliances, and supply chain weaponization amid geopolitical cyber shifts.

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